Sedona, AZ — Boy, did they make a mistake thinking they could take out Iran in a matter of weeks.
The gamble appears to have been that once Iran’s leadership was decapitated in a surprise attack, the Iranian people would rise up against the regime and finish the job.
But that didn’t happen.
Years of repression had already taken their toll on the opposition inside Iran. Those who might have challenged the government had been killed, imprisoned, driven into exile or intimidated into silence.
We should have understood that before believing assassinating the country’s leadership would automatically produce a popular uprising.
We also underestimated the resilience of Iran and its military.
Iran had spent years accumulating missiles, drones and other military hardware and building the ability to withstand an attack. The United States, meanwhile, has discovered something that should concern every American: even the world’s most powerful military does not possess an unlimited supply of the sophisticated weapons required to fight this kind of war.
The United States has burned through significant numbers of Patriot and THAAD missile interceptors. Some estimates now place Patriot inventories below 1,000 and THAAD inventories around 250. Those weapons cannot simply be replaced overnight.
That leaves American leadership in a precarious position.
Escalating the war means expending still more missiles, bombs and defensive interceptors. Eventually, protecting American troops, bases and allies throughout the Middle East becomes increasingly difficult.
Iran understands this.
That may be one reason Tehran believes time is on its side.
The United States can certainly continue striking Iran. What it cannot easily do is force a nation of more than 90 million people to surrender through air power alone.
And unless America is willing to contemplate an enormous ground war—which would create an entirely different military and political nightmare—the choices begin narrowing.
Which leaves the most obvious one:
Negotiate.
The problem is that Washington cannot simply announce that it wants out.
It has to find a way out while convincing the American public and the world that the objectives of the war were accomplished.
So, what happens next?
We hear that America’s principal military objectives have been achieved, that Iran’s ability to threaten the United States and its allies has been sufficiently degraded, and that continued warfare is therefore unnecessary.
That will provide the political language necessary to move from warfare to negotiation.
The Strait of Hormuz will undoubtedly be at the center of those negotiations.
Iran wants a continuing role in controlling what happens in those waters. Washington insists upon freedom of navigation. The eventual agreement may therefore be written so both sides can claim victory.
Iran will tell its people it defended its sovereignty.
America will tell its people it secured navigation through the Strait.
And everybody will declare success.
The nuclear issue may follow a similar path.
Iran could agree once again that it will not build a nuclear weapon while retaining some form of peaceful nuclear program. Washington could then claim it prevented an Iranian bomb, while Tehran could claim it preserved its right to nuclear technology.
Suddenly yesterday’s enemies could find themselves sitting across negotiating tables discussing sanctions, trade and commerce.
It wouldn’t be the first time.
Israel, meanwhile, would remain the regional military hammer—restrained when diplomacy is working but always present should Iran again threaten Israeli or American interests.
Iran’s regional proxies would remain another piece on the chessboard, capable of being activated should the confrontation resume.
Nobody necessarily wins.
Nobody admits defeat.
Everybody saves face.
And perhaps that is how this war eventually ends.
There is, however, another possibility worth watching.
Cuba.
The Trump administration has already dramatically increased pressure on the Cuban government, and Pentagon officials have reportedly examined military options involving the island. That does not mean an invasion has been ordered or will happen.
But politically, Cuba presents an interesting contrast with Iran.
It is geographically close to the United States, militarily far weaker than Iran, and its government is already under enormous economic pressure.
A rapid American success there—or even the collapse of the Cuban government without a full-scale invasion—could shift the public’s attention away from an inconclusive struggle in the Middle East and toward what the administration could portray as a historic victory in the Western Hemisphere.
Whether that happens remains to be seen.
But one thing seems increasingly clear.
America cannot fire expensive missiles indefinitely while waiting for Iran to surrender.
Iran knows it.
Washington knows it.
The defense contractors certainly know it—they’re now being told to dramatically accelerate production.
So beneath all the threats, speeches and declarations of victory, diplomacy is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.
The challenge now isn’t merely finding a way to stop the war.
It’s finding a way for everybody to stop fighting while claiming they won.
By Tommy Acosta